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Abstract 
A cornerstone of monetary policy making is that a looser monetary policy is associated 
with lower interest rates, higher growth of narrow monetary aggregates, higher output 
and higher inflation. These responses, which we collectively refer to as the liquidity 
effect hypothesis, are at odds with some of the leading theoretical models of money. This 
paper proposes and implements a quasi-Bayesian methodology that allows us to compare 
the liquidity effect hypothesis with two other hypotheses: the sticky price hypothesis and 
the inflation tax hypothesis. Our results indicate that there is evidence against the 
liquidity effect hypothesis in U.S. data, but that a skeptical Bayesian decision maker 
would still assign most posterior weight it. For Japan, in contrast, even a skeptic would 
end up favoring the sticky price hypothesis.  Journal of Economic Literature 
Classification numbers: E0, E5, F0. 
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1 Introduction 
 
A cornerstone of central bank policy making is that the way to stimulate the economy 
is to lower interest rates and thereby increase the supply of narrow money.  Since Lucas￿s 
(1972) seminal article it has been generally accepted that in fact, only surprise changes in 
monetary policy are likely to have real effects. Still, this view of the effects of 
innovations in monetary policy on economic activity is so prevalent that many monetary 
economists evaluate the success of their models according to their ability to produce 
lower short term nominal interest rates, higher narrow monetary aggregates, and higher 
prices in response to a expansionary monetary policy shock.  
In the empirical VAR literature on money, for instance, these assumptions are the 
starting point of identifying a shock to monetary policy
1. When results are inconsistent 
with one of these assumptions, this is thought to be a shortcoming of the empirical 
specification. Thus when an identified expansionary monetary policy shock produces a 
fall in the price level it is referred to as a price puzzle.  
This prevailing wisdom about the workings of monetary policy has also had a 
profound influence on monetary theory.  For instance, the finding by Greenwood and 
Huffman (1987) that calibrated versions of real business cycle models with money have 
the property that unexpected increases in the growth rate of money increase nominal 
interest rates, and inflation and lower output and employment, is perceived by many to be 
shortcoming of this class of model (see e.g. Christiano (1991). Subsequent work by Lucas 
                                                 
1 See Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Eichenbaum, Christiano and Evans (1996) and Leeper, Sims and Zha 
(1996) for some recent examples.   3
(1990) and Fuerst (1992) was specifically motivated by a desire to overturn this 
counterfactual implication of flexible price models of money.  
The gap between the predictions of theory and prevailing wisdom is not limited to 
flexible price models of money. In Rotemberg￿s (1996) sticky price model with 
monopolisitically competitive intermediate goods producers, interest rates and output 
both rise in response to a surprise increase in the growth rate of money.   
Considerable efforts have been devoted to building theoretical models that are 
consistent with the prevailing wisdom.  Yet success has been elusive. It is remarkably 
difficult to formulate either sticky price or flexible price models that produce large 
persistent liquidity effects without appealing to quadratic adjustment costs and/or 
assuming labor supply elasticities that are implausibly large (see e.g. Christiano (1991) 
and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997)).  Indeed, theory suggests that the 
liquidity effect hypothesis may not be a particularly robust phenomenon. The magnitude 
of liquidity effects is likely to vary across time and countries and its persistence will 
depend on details of the economy that we don￿t have much information about. 
The goal of this paper is to submit this cornerstone of monetary policy to more 
careful scrutiny and evaluate it on an equal footing with leading alternatives that are 
implied by theory. Using a quasi Bayesian procedure we empirically evaluate three 
alternative hypotheses about the workings of monetary policy.  The first hypothesis, 
which we will refer to as the inflation tax hypothesis, is consistent with flexible price 
cash-in-advance models of money such as Lucas and Stokey (1987), Greenwood and 
Huffman (1987), Cooley and Hansen (1989), and Sargent (1987). In all of these models a 
persistent innovation in the growth rate of money raises the nominal interest rate,   4
increases inflation and lowers output. The second hypothesis, which we will hereafter 
refer to as the liquidity effect hypothesis, coincides with the conventional wisdom of how 
monetary policy effects the economy: a surprise loosening monetary policy lowers short 
term interest rates, increases narrow monetary aggregates, raises output and raises the 
price level. The liquidity effect hypothesis is consistent with the implications of the 
flexible price models described in Christiano (1991) and Fuerst (1992). The third 
hypothesis we will consider is that an innovation in the growth rate of money acts to raise 
nominal interest rates, output and prices. These responses are produced by Rotemberg￿s 
(1996) sticky price model (see also Ireland (1997) and Aiyagari and Braun (1998)).  At 
the risk of abusing the term, we will refer to these joint implications as the sticky price 
hypothesis. 
We evaluate each of these hypotheses using a monte carlo based procedure proposed 
by Uhlig (2001)
2. This procedure achieves identification by imposing sign restrictions 
directly on the impulse responses of reduced form Vector Autoregressions (VAR￿s) and 
can be given a  Bayesian interpretation that allows one to calculate the posterior odds of 
alternative identification schemes. 
Our findings indicate that there are important differences between the effects of 
monetary policy in Japan and the United States. In both countries we find evidence 
against the liquidity effect hypothesis. For the United States this evidence is not 
compelling.  A skeptic who places high prior weights on the liquidity effect hypothesis 
would continue to be assign most posterior weight to the liquidity effect hypothesis after 
viewing our results.  However, for Japan there is strong evidence that the data is more 
consistent with the sticky price hypothesis. This evidence would even convince a 
                                                 
2 We follow Uhlig(1999) here. But see also Faust (1999) and Canova (2001) for related approaches.   5
skeptical Bayesian decision maker who places a prior weight of 0.9 on the liquidity effect 
model and 0.05 prior weight on the sticky price model. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical 
motivation for the three hypotheses in more detail. Section 3 describes the details of our 
identification and evaluation procedures. Section 4 contains the results and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2 Theoretical  Motivation 
 
This section motivates the choice of our three hypotheses regarding the effects of an 
innovation in monetary policy.  We start by describing the inflation tax hypothesis. 
Monetary economists have understood that inflation acts as a tax at least since Friedman 
(1968). Greenwood and Huffman (1987) find that the inflation tax hypothesis is 
quantitatively important. They consider the dynamic effects of innovations in monetary 
policy in a calibrated cash-in-advance model and find that a positive innovation in the 
growth rate of money increases nominal interest rates, increases prices and lowers 
employment. In their model, inflation is a tax on labor income that induces households to 
work less and thus lowers output. This inflation tax effect is present in most transaction 
demand models of money in which there is a labor supply decision.  
The second hypothesis is the liquidity effect hypothesis. While this hypothesis is the 
maintained hypothesis underlying most central bank actions, it is only recently that 
theories have been developed that produce liquidity effects in flexible price general 
equilibrium models. Lucas (1990) and Fuerst (1991) were some of the first researchers to   6
develop models that are consistent with this hypothesis. These models limit the ability of 
certain sectors to interact or react to an innovation in money supply. Christiano (1991) 
subsequently found that calibrated versions of these models often had the property that 
the inflation tax effect was larger than the liquidity effect. Even though a liquidity effect 
was present, the equilibrium responses in most cases were consistent with the inflation 
tax hypothesis.  In addition, even when the responses were consistent with the liquidity 
effect hypothesis, they were not persistent and disappeared in the next period after 
households and firms readjusted their portfolios. Typically adjustment costs of one form 
or another are needed to generate persistent liquidity effects (see also Christiano and Gust 
(1999)).  
The final hypothesis is based on the work of Rotemberg (1996). Rotemberg posits a 
model in which monopolistically competitive firms incur costs when they adjust their 
prices.  A demand for money is introduced using a cash-in-advance constraint. His model 
successfully reproduces some of the principal empirical features of the data but has the 
property that a surprise increase in the growth rate of money supply raises nominal 
interest rates, output and prices. The reason for this is that at the time of the arrival of the 
shock, expectations of higher future inflation act to raise the nominal interest rate. 
However, prices do not fully respond to the innovation and thus current consumption is 
temporarily a bargain. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) find that this property 
of Rotemberg￿s model is robust to many natural extensions. They do succeed in 
producing a specification in which the nominal interest rate falls, but find that it implies a 
labor supply elasticity that is implausibly large and that harms the model￿s performance 
in other dimensions.   7
An assumption made in most of the analyses described above is that the growth rate 
of money supply is exogenous and persistent. This assumption is not innocuous and 
relaxing it could conceivably overturn all of the theoretical results documented above. 
Unfortunately, our understanding of how these properties of the models vary with the 
specification of the monetary policy feedback rule is in its infancy. However, results in 
Aiyagari and Braun (1998) suggest that these properties of the models may be reasonably 
robust to the exact details of the feedback rule. They compare and contrast simple 
exogenous money supply rules with optimal monetary policies in a liquidity effect model 
and a Rotemberg type sticky price model. In both models there is a role for an activist 
monetary policy.  It turns out that the qualitative properties of the responses, which form 
the basis of our hypotheses, are the same under both the exogenous and optimal monetary 
policies. 
Finally it should be pointed out that all of the empirical work described above is 
calibrated to U.S. data. We will assume below that these hypotheses are empirically 
relevant for Japan too. 
3 The  statistical  model 
 
In this section we describe the reduced form VAR￿s, the choice of variables and the 
simulation methodology used to evaluate the alternative hypotheses. 
 
3.1 The reduced form VAR  
 
We start from assuming the following VAR model for the macro structure: 
  xC C L x uu I I D tt t t ++ =+ + 10 1 0 () , ~ (,) Σ  (3.1)   8
where  xt is a (Kx1) vector of macroeconomic variables, L is a lag operator, and 
CL C CL CL J
J () . . . =+ + +
−
12
1. In order to identify the innovation to monetary policy we 
orthogonalize the variance-covariance matrix of ut. That is we find a P such that 
  10 1 () , ( ’ ’ ) . tt t t t PxP C P C L x P u E P u u P I ++ =+ + =  (3.2) 
The details of how P is chosen are described below. Using the transformations 
~ xP x tt = and ε tt Pu =  we can rewrite (3.2) as: 
  ~ () ~ xP C P C L P x tt t +
−
+ =+ + 10
1
1 ε .   (3.3) 
 
3.2 Variable selection  
 
The choice of variables for the VAR is motivated by two criteria. First, we want a list 
of variables that collectively summarizes the principal links between monetary policy and 
the economy. In particular, we want to include the most important variables considered 
by the monetary authority when conducting monetary policy. Second, we also want the 
list to include those variables that are known to produce a liquidity effect. That is we 
want to bias things in favor of the conventional explanation.
3  These considerations led us 
to consider two distinct lists of monthly variables for the U.S. and one list of monthly 
variables for Japan. Our baseline VAR model for the U.S. consists of the six variables: 
US
t x =(CPIt, Yt, NBRt, Rt, TOTRt, PCOMt)’ where CPI is the price level as measured by 
the Consumer Price Index, Y is output as measured by Industrial Production, NBR is non-
borrowed reserves, R is the federal funds rate, and PCOM  is a commodity price index. 
                                                 
3 Below we will report evidence against the liquidity effect hypothesis.  By choosing variables that are 
known to be consistent with this hypothesis we are giving this hypothesis its best possible chance. This 
makes our evidence against this hypothesis more compelling.   9
We use a different baseline set of variables for Japan. First, we omit non-borrowed 
reserves. There is no evidence that the Bank of Japan has monitored non-borrowed 
reserves and in fact they do not even release data on non-borrowed reserves. In addition, 
efforts to construct non-borrowed reserves from existing data have  the peculiar property 
that they are negative for substantial sub-periods of our sample.
4 Our list of variables for 
Japan consists of
JP
t x =(CPIt, Yt, TOTRt, Rt, M0t, FXt)’ where, R is the call rate rate
5, M0 is 
the monetary base, and FX is the yen/$ spot exchange rate.  The yen/$ exchange rate is 
included because it is an important information variable for the Bank of Japan. In order to 
facilitate comparison between Japan and the U.S. and to check the robustness of our 
conclusions for the U.S., we also report results for the U.S. using the CPI, industrial 
production, total reserves, the monetary base and the spot $/yen exchange rate.  
3.3 Identification of Structural Shocks 
 
Our strategy for identifying structural shocks combines zero restrictions on the 
contemporaneous response of variables to structural shocks with sign restrictions on the 
impulse response functions.   
3.3.1 Zero  restrictions   
 
We impose a block recursive structure that nests the recursive identification scheme 
advocated by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998) as a special case.  We partition 
the vector of variables into three blocks. For the U.S. baseline case, the first block 
consists of the price level and industrial production, the second bock includes non-
borrowed reserves and the federal funds rate. The third block includes total reserves and 
the commodity price index. To set notation suppose that P
-1 is block triangular: 
                                                 
4 See Shioji (2000) for more details. 


































P  (3.4) 
All the sub-blocks of P
-1 are dimensioned (2x2). Observe next that 
11 ’ P P
−− Σ=  
implies that Σ  will have the same number and shape of partitions as P
-1. 
The block recursive structure is reflected by the fact that the partitions above the 
diagonal are all matrices of zeros. This structure imposes restrictions on the 
contemporaneous responses of variables in sector j to shocks in sector i. Under these 
assumptions all variables in the second and third blocks respond contemporaneously to 
shocks in the price level and industrial production
6. Shocks to non-borrowed reserves and 
the federal funds rate will only have contemporaneous affects on variables in blocks two 
and three. Total reserves and the commodity price index have no contemporaneous affect 
on variables in the other two sectors.  
Under these assumptions the task of identifying the five structural shocks comes 
down to determining the sub-matrix  P 22
1 − .  Our recursive restriction on the first block is 
sufficient to pin down 
1
21 P
−  and 
1
31 P
− .  Given a particular choice of  
1
22
− P , 
1
32
− P  is determined 
uniquely from Σ. 
The block recursive structure does impose some restrictions on  P 22
1 − .  The elements of 
P 22
1 −  must be chosen so that: 
1)  shocks to non-borrowed reserves and the federal funds rate are orthogonal. 
and 
                                                 
6 Formally we can identify monetary policy without imposing any other restrictions on the (1,1) block of P.  
However, identification of monetary policy also depends on the other auxiliary assumptions relating to the 
block triangular structure of P. In Braun and Shioji (2001) we attempt to completely identify all of the 
shocks.   11
2) 
11 1
22 22 22 21 11 21 ’’ PP
−− − =Σ −Σ Σ Σ ≡Ω  
We will show below that these restrictions only identify  P 22
1 −  up to a scalar.   
3.2.2 Sign Restrictions 
The system described above is not completely identified. In order to complete the 
identification of monetary policy, we impose sign restrictions on the impulse response 
functions. Our methodology for doing this is a rejection based quasi-bayesian monte-
carlo procedure that builds on previous work by Canova (2002), Faust (1999), and Uhlig 
(2001). 
Before going into the details, it is helpful to the reader to provide an overview of how 
this procedure works. We start with a set of sign restrictions on the impulse response 
functions that embodies one of our three hypotheses regarding the effects of monetary 
policy shocks on economic activity. The exact form of the restrictions and their 
motivation are described in section 4 below.  We then randomly draw from the posterior 
distributions of the matrix of reduced form VAR coefficients, the variance covariance 
matrix of the error term, Σ , and the free elements of   P 22
1 −  to find a set of coefficients that 
satisfy the sign restrictions. If a particular monte-carlo draw satisfies the sign restrictions 
we tabulate it, otherwise it is discarded.   
Let  0 ￿ C ,  ￿() CL and  ￿ Σ  denote the estimated values of the coefficients and variance 
covariance matrix of the estimated reduced form VAR. Under a diffuse prior the 
coefficients￿ posterior will be normally distributed and the variance covariance matrix 
will be Wishart distributed (see Uhlig (2001) for more details).  The first step is to take a 
draw from the posterior distribution of coefficients and variance covariance matrix of the 
VAR. Denote the i
th random draw by  0, ￿￿ ￿ {, ( ) , } ii i CC L Σ . A draw from the posterior   12
distribution of the variance covariance matrix gives us a random realization for the sub-
matrix  22, ￿
i Σ  and a realization of   ￿
i Ω  given in (3.4). Next, we calculate the eigenvalues 
and eigenvectors of  22, ￿
i Σ  and  ￿
i Ω  and perform a second monte carlo simulation over the 
free elements in  P 22
1 − . 
 Take  22, ￿
i Σ  and denote the eigenvalues of  this (2 2) x  matrix as µ 1 and µ 2 , and the 
corresponding eigenvectors as v1 and v2 . Uhlig(2001) shows that the first column of 
1
22 P








=⋅ ⋅ ∑  (3.5) 










= ∑ . (3.6) 
This leaves us with one degree of freedom to determine the weights. We draw α 1￿s 
randomly from a uniform distribution, and then choose α 2￿s to satisfy condition (3.6). 
An α  chosen in this way pins down the first column of 
1
22 P
− . The second column is 
calculated using the restriction 
11 1
22 22 22 21 11 21 ’’ PP
−− − =Σ −Σ Σ Σ ≡Ω .  At this point we have a 
completely specified data generating mechanism and can calculate impulse response 
functions and ascertain whether or not they satisfy our sign restrictions.  
 We turn now to describe how sign restrictions on the impulse response functions are 
imposed and used to discriminate among the three hypotheses. 
   13
3.4 Imposing the three hypotheses on the data 
 
Table 1 summarizes the sign restrictions that the three hypotheses imply for the 
responses of prices, output, narrow money and the interest rate following a contractionary 
monetary policy shock. Observe that the three hypotheses impose distinct restrictions on 
the impulse response functions. 
 
Table 1 
Response of macroeconomic variables to a contractionary monetary policy shock 
under the three alternative hypotheses
7. 








Down Down  Down  Up 
Sticky Price 
hypothesis 
Down Down  Down  Down 
 
In order to complete the specification of the sign restrictions it is necessary to specify 
the horizon over which these restrictions are binding. Friedman (1968) suggested that the 
liquidity effect might be operative at horizons of up to a year. We choose to only restrict 
the responses in the first five to six months after the arrival of the shock and do so in a 
rather weak way. Let month 0 denote the month in which the shock to monetary policy 
arrives, month 1 denote the first month after the arrival of the shock and etc. For output 
and prices we will assume that the sign restriction for a particular hypothesis is satisfied 
if the impulse response function for the respective variable has the correct sign in a 
majority of months 1 through 6.  For money and the interest rate we will assume that the 
                                                 
7 Note that we are defining a contractionary monetary policy here to be one that produces a fall in output.   14
hypothesis is satisfied if the impulse response function for the respective variable has the 
correct sign in a majority of steps 0 through 5. This distinction between prices and output, 
on the one hand, and money and interest rates, on the other hand, arises because the block 
recursive structure implies that the response of output and prices in month 0 is zero.  
In choosing this particular set of sign restrictions we tried to strike a balance between 
two issues. First, in existing monetary models most variables respond quickly to 
innovations in monetary policy and responses peak within one or two months of the 
arrival of the shock.  While these models may be lacking in propagation, they reflect our 
best understanding of how the economy works and we think these restrictions should be 
taken seriously and imposed on the data. On the other hand, the empirical VAR literature 
on identifying monetary policy shocks often finds that it can take up to two years for 
some variables, such as prices, to show a statistically significant response. To 
accommodate these findings, we chose to make the restrictions relatively weak and only 
require that a majority of the signs be correct in the first 5 to 6 months after the arrival of 
the shock.  
Finally, it is important to note that these sign restrictions are joint restrictions on the 
coefficients of the VAR, the variance covariance matrix of the disturbances and the  ’s α . 
A valid data-generating mechanism consists of a draw from the posterior distribution of 
the estimated coefficients, a draw from the posterior distribution of the variance 
covariance matrix, Σ , and a particular vector of  ’s α  that satisfy all of the sign 
restrictions for a particular hypothesis. Thus, the frequency of valid draws for a particular 
hypothesis can also be interpreted as a measure of the model￿s fit. 
Up to this point the discussion has allowed for uncertainty in the parameters of a   15
particular model, but has not allowed for structural uncertainty. There are two different 
types of structural uncertainty that we would like to consider. First, we would like to 
allow for uncertainty about which of the three hypotheses is best. Second, we would also 
like to allow for uncertainty about the number of lags in the VAR.  
To assess the plausibility of the alternative structures, {Si, i=1,2,￿,I }, we calculate 
the posterior probabilities of each structure given the data  X  using Bayes formula:  
 (|) () (|) ii i pS X c pS pX S !  (3.5) 
where c is a normalizing constant that insures that the probabilities sum to one, ( ) i pS  is 
the prior probability of each structure, and  ( | ) i pX S  is the probability of the data given Si. 
The frequency of successful draws for each hypothesis, which we have described how to 
calculate above, provides us with  ￿ ￿ (|, ,) i p XC S Σ . Then using the following formula 
proposed by Draper (1995) we can approximate  ( | ) i pX S  by: 
 
11 ￿ ￿ ln ( | ) ln(2 ) ln ln ( | , , )
22
ii i i pX S k k n pX C S π =− +Σ  (3.6) 
where ki is the number of parameters in the i
th  structure and n is the number of 
observations. This formula is particularly useful when comparing across specifications 
with different lag lengths and thus numbers of parameters. 
4 Results 
 
4.1 U.S. data 
 
Table 2 reports the number of successful draws under each of the three hypotheses 
under four different scenarios. All results are based on a sample period running from   16
1981:1 through 1999:12. The total number of draws in each case was 50,000. Results are 
reported for VAR￿s with 12 lags. 
Table 2 
U.S. data VAR(12): Number of valid draws out of 50,000 total draws. 
  Baseline: CPI, IP, NBR, R, 
TOTR, PCOM 













4,812 12,047  683  1,248 
Sticky Price 
Hypothesis 
4,819 4,935 5,136 5,196 
Inflation Tax 
Hypothesis 
9,232 9,641 14,806  14,968 
 
The first column reports results for the baseline set of variables with all of the 
constraints described in section 3.4 imposed. If one starts from a uniform prior over the 
three alternative hypotheses, the posterior odds ratios indicate that the inflation tax 
hypothesis is 1.9 times as likely as the other two hypotheses. The results also imply that 
the sticky price hypothesis and the liquidity effect hypothesis are equally plausible. 
Given the strong priors that the profession has in favor of the liquidity effect 
hypothesis, it is interesting to ask how this empirical evidence might affect the beliefs of 
a Bayesian decision maker whose prior is heavily weighted in favor of the liquidity effect 
hypothesis. Suppose that one starts with prior beliefs of  (0.9, 0.05, 0.05) over   17
respectively the liquidity effect hypothesis, the sticky price hypothesis and the inflation 
tax hypothesis, then these results imply posterior probabilities of  (0.86, 0.048, 0.092).  
From this we see that a Bayesian decision maker would continue to be very confident in 
the liquidity effect hypothesis after viewing the evidence presented in column 1. 
The impulse response functions and one standard error confidence intervals for the 
baseline results reported in column 1 can be found in Figure 1.  Looking first at the 
results for the liquidity effect hypothesis in the first column we see that the results are 
broadly consistent with findings elsewhere in the literature (see e.g. Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998) for a survey). The price response is small in early periods 
and then declines thereafter. Non-borrowed reserves fall sharply in early periods but 
damp quickly.  By period 6, the response of non-borrowed reserves is insignificantly 
different from zero. The response of the Federal funds rate is also strongest in early 
periods but transient.  The response of total reserves is persistently negative. And 
commodity prices cycle down, up and down. The response of output though is different 
from the previous literature. Even though we restrict the output response to be negative in 
a majority of the first 5 periods, output rises in the first two periods following the shock.  
The results for the sticky price hypothesis and the inflation tax hypothesis are 
reported respectively in columns two and three. Notice that the results for these two 
hypotheses are quite similar with the exception of output. Output falls in early periods for 
the sticky price hypothesis and rises in all periods for the inflation tax hypothesis. The 
similarity of the responses for the two hypotheses is broadly consistent with what theory 
would predict. As prices adjust under the sticky price hypothesis, one would expect that   18
the inflation tax effect would dominate and that the responses at medium horizons would 
be very similar under the two hypotheses.  
Finally, note that there is a substantial difference in the output response between the 
liquidity effect hypothesis, on the one hand, and the sticky price and inflation tax 
hypotheses on the other hand. Under the liquidity effect hypothesis the response of output 
is about zero from month 10 and on. Under the other two hypotheses the response of 
output is larger and more persistent. This finding is also confirmed by variance 
decompositions.  Under the liquidity effect hypothesis monetary policy explains less than 
3.5% of the variance in output at all horizons of 24 months or less.  Under the inflation 
tax hypothesis, on the other hand, monetary policy explains 11% of the variance in output 
at the 12 month horizon and 15% of the variance in output at the 24 month horizon. 
Do commodity prices resolve the price puzzle? 
It has been argued that for U.S. data including commodity prices in the list of 
variables resolves the price puzzle. Our framework provides a way to assess this 
question. If the commodity price index resolves the price puzzle then relaxing the 
restriction on prices should not have much affect on the number of accepted draws or on 
the nature of the response of prices under the liquidity effect hypothesis. Results reported 
in column 2 suggest that commodity prices are not a complete resolution to the price 
puzzle. Notice that the number of successes for the liquidity effect hypothesis rises 
substantially. This shows that our sign constraint that prices have the correct sign in a 
majority of the first 6 periods binds even when commodity prices are included in the 
VAR. Plots of the average impulse response functions for this scenario are presented 
Figure 2. If we compare the responses for the liquidity effect hypothesis reported in   19
Figure 2 with those in Figure 1, they don￿t look all that different. Now the response of the 
CPI rises slightly in early periods before falling from month 7 and on.  Both plots of 
prices are consistent with the notion that prices don￿t respond much in early periods 
following a shock to monetary policy. 
4.1.1 Robustness 
 
Much of the previous VAR literature has conditioned on the assumption that the 
liquidity effect hypothesis is correct. The results presented so far show some evidence 
against this hypothesis using monthly U.S. data. Still, a skeptical Bayesian decision 
maker who is reasonably firm in the belief that the liquidity effect hypothesis is correct 
would still assign most weight to the liquidity effect hypothesis after being presented 
with empirical evidence on the other two hypotheses.  However, the analysis, so far, has 
used the same variables and the same number of lags as the previous literature.  
Presumably, both the choice of variables and the number of lags in the previous literature 
has been to some extent driven by a desire to produce impulse responses that are 
consistent with the predictions of the liquidity effect hypothesis. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 provide some evidence on the extent to which the results 
depend on the particular choice of variables. These results are based on runs with 12 lags, 
a sample period of 1981:1 through 1999:12 and a vector of variables that consists of the 
consumer price index, industrial production, total reserves, monetary base and the $/yen 
exchange rate. We chose these variables because they include some of the more 
important determinants of demand and supply for reserves and base money and also other 
potentially important information variables e.g. the $/yen exchange rate. We have left the 
commodity price level out because as we noted above it doesn￿t resolve the price puzzle.   20
In addition this same set of variables is also available for Japan. This facilitates 
comparison of the results across the two countries.  The results using this alternate set of 
variables offers stronger evidence in favor of the inflation tax hypothesis.  Now if one 
starts with a prior of (0.9, 0.05, 0.05) the posterior distribution over the three hypotheses 
is: (0.38, 0.16, 0.46 ) with all constraints imposed. If the restrictions are relaxed on the 
response of prices the posterior distribution of the three hypotheses is: (0.53,0.12,0.35). 
From this we see that the results favoring the liquidity effect hypothesis are not robust to 
the choice of dataset.  As in the baseline specification relaxing the constraints on the 
response of prices does not produce a price puzzle.  
Table 3 
U.S. Baseline specification: VAR (3), VAR(6) and VAR(12), all constraints 
imposed.  




2005 2266  4812 
Sticky Price 
Hypothesis 
15959 8626  4819 
Inflation Tax 
Hypothesis 
1284 6416  9232 
 
Finally, to investigate the robustness to the number of lags we also repeated the 
simulations for the baseline model using 3 and 6 lags.  The results for the baseline 
parameterization are reported in Table 3. An inspection of this table indicates that the   21
results are not robust to the number of lags. For both the three lag and six lag 
specifications the sticky price hypothesis has the highest number of valid draws. Using 
formula (3.6) we can also do comparisons across alternative lag lengths. Applying 
formula (3.6) to calculate  ( | ) i pX S  effectively rules out all of the specifications with 6 
or 12 lags. This is because the large number of additional parameters in the 6 and 12 lag 
specifications reduces their conditional probabilities by several orders of magnitude. 
According to this metric for correcting for degrees of freedom the only results for the 
baseline specification that are relevant are those reported in column 1 of Table 3. If we 
start with a prior of (0.9, 0.05, 0.05), the posterior odds are respectively (0.68, 0.3, 0.02). 
Thus, a skeptical Bayesian decision maker would still assign posterior odds of about 2 to 
1 in favor of the liquidity effect hypothesis
8.   
Overall, the results presented here indicate that if one conditions on the variables 
generally used in the empirical VAR literature and assigns high prior probability to the 
liquidity effect hypothesis, it is not possible to rule it out as the most likely of the three 
hypotheses for the United States.   
4.2  Results for Japan 
 
For Japan we consider a VAR that includes the CPI less food, industrial production, 
total reserves, the call rate, M-0 and the yen/$ exchange rate. The sample period starts in 
1981:1 and ends in 1996:12. We chose to end the sample period here because there were 
several unusual events that occurred in 1998-1999. In 1998 markets for overnight interest 
rates were disrupted due to concerns about default by Japanese banks. The Bank of 
Japan￿s zero interest rate policy caused further disruptions in 1999. Results for Japan 
                                                 
8 We also simulated 3 and 6 lag specifications in which prices were not restricted. However, these 
specifications produced persistent price puzzles that lasted 17-24 months.   22
using 3, 6 and 12 lags in the VAR are reported in Table 4. 
Table 4 
 Japan: Number of valid draws out of 50,000 total draws for alternative lag 
lengths and alternative identifying assumptions 
  All constraints imposed  No constraints on response of prices 












2,664 3,429 1,770 2,985 3,651 1,801 
 
Consider first the results with 12 lags reported in column 3.  Notice that the sticky 
price hypothesis has the highest number of successful draws. Even if one starts out with 
priors of (0.9, .05, .05), the posterior odds of (0.44, 0.52, 0.04) favor the sticky price 
hypothesis. The impulse responses for the specification with 12 lags are reported in 
Figure 4. A comparison of the second and third columns in Figure 3 reveals an important 
difference between the sticky price and inflation tax hypothesis results. The output 
responses under the two hypotheses are quite different.  Under the sticky price hypothesis 
the response of output is negative for 20 months before turning positive. Under the 
inflation tax hypothesis, in contrast, the response is positive in all months except month 2.   
 There are also some differences in the response of exchange rates across the three 
hypotheses.  Under the liquidity effect hypothesis the response of the exchange rate is 
generally negative indicating nominal appreciation of the yen while under the other two 
hypotheses the yen appreciates in the impact period and then depreciates in all 
subsequent periods. However, it is difficult to assess whether these exchange rate   23
responses are consistent with theory without imposing other restrictions from theory such 
as uncovered interest rate parity
9. 
Returning to Table 4, consider next columns one and two that report results with three 
and six lags. Here the evidence against the liquidity effect hypothesis is even more 
compelling. As was the case for U.S. data, adjustments for degrees of freedom using 
equation (3.6) rule out all specifications with six and twelve lags and lead one to assign 
all the mass of the posterior distribution to the results with three lags. For the three lag 
specification the posterior probabilities associated with a prior of (0.9, 0.05, 0.05) are (0, 
0.71, 0.29). The liquidity effect hypothesis has a posterior probability of about zero. 
These results indicate that the sticky price hypothesis is the best description of how 
monetary policy affects the macroeconomy in Japan.  
Consider next column 6, which reports results for a 12 lag specification with no 
restrictions imposed on the response of prices. Here the performance of the liquidity 
effect hypothesis is substantially better. Relaxing this restriction on prices increases the 
number of successful draws from 1,138 to 12,220. However, this is not without a cost as 
can be seen in Figure 5. Relaxing this restriction also produces a persistent price puzzle. 
Prices have the wrong sign in each and every one of the first 24 months following the 
arrival of the shock. Persistent price puzzles also occur in the unrestricted 3 and 6 lag 
specifications.  Inasmuch as a persistent positive price response is inconsistent with the 
implications of the liquidity effect hypothesis, these results are inadmissible.  
 
 
                                                 
9 We were unwilling to do this given the considerable evidence against uncovered interest rate parity. (See 
e.g. Engel (1995) for a survey of the literature on this topic.)   24
4.2.1 Robustness   
 
In results not reported here we have also experimented with other lists of variables. 
One case of particular interest is whether including commodity prices resolves the price 
puzzle for Japan. This does not occur. We performed a simulation for a 12 lag 
specification in which the variables were the Consumer Price Index less food, industrial 
production, total reserves, the call rate, M0 and a commodity price index. For the 
liquidity effect hypothesis the number of successful draws fell from 1,138, as reported in 
column 3 of Table 4, to 794.  The Japanese price puzzle is not resolved by including 
commodity prices. 
McCallum (1994) has argued that the spread on long and short rates is an important 
information variable for the monetary authority so we also re-estimated the three models 
using CPI less food, industrial production, M0, the call rate rate, the yield on 10 year 
offshore swaps
10 and the yen/dollar exchange rate. For a specification with 12 lags the 
posterior distribution associated with our skeptical prior was (.04, .80, .6). We also 
extended the sample to 1999:12 and found that including this additional data had no 
substantial effect on the results. Finally, we also tried runs using the 1 month Tibor rate 
instead of the call rate and found that this also had no substantive effect on our results.  
Taken together these results indicate that Japanese data is inconsistent with the 




                                                 
10 Open market purchases and sales of long-term bonds are large in Japan- about 70% of monetary base in 
Japan is backed by long-term bonds.   25
5 Concluding  Remarks 
 
 A cornerstone of central bank policy in most countries is that an expansionary 
monetary policy is associated with the liquidity effect hypothesis. Results presented here 
suggest that this premise should be viewed with caution. Using monthly data we have 
found that it is difficult to dismiss this hypothesis using monthly U.S. data. However, this 
empirical support is not robust to changes in the list of variables.  
For Japan, it is much more difficult to reconcile monthly data with the liquidity effect 
hypothesis. The sticky price hypothesis performs better across a wide variety of 
specifications.  
 It￿s worth noting that our results are not of necessarily at odds with the liquidity 
effects in high frequency Japanese data on bank reserves.
11 Hayashi (2000), for instance, 
has found empirical evidence of liquidity effects at the end of reserve maintenance 
periods. If periodic unexpected shocks to bank￿s reserves occur towards the end of the 
maintenance period, this can induce a precautionary demand for liquidity. However, these 
effects disappear at the start of the next maintenance period because banks reserve 
requirements are based on average balances over the entire maintenance period and they 
thus have great flexibility in adjusting their reserve balances early in the maintenance 
period. Embedding these types institutional details of the Japanese market for reserves in 
a general equilibrium hypothesis that can link these types of liquidity effects to 
movements in larger monetary aggregates or other macro variables is an interesting topic 
for future research.  
                                                 
11 Note that this use of the term liquidity effect is more narrowly defined as an increase in the supply of 
reserves that drives the overnight rate down.   26
More generally we view the empirical methodology we have described here to be an 
attractive way to incorporate identifying restrictions from theory. In related work we 
condition on the sticky price hypothesis for Japan and investigate the response of the 
Japanese Term Structure of Interest rates to innovations in monetary policy. We are also 
exploring generalizations of Uhlig￿s identification scheme in which we attempt a more 
general identification of macro shocks in an asset-pricing framework.   27
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